The concept of mind uploading, which involves transitioning a person from their biological body to a synthetic hardware, has gained attention in the transhumanism movement. Advocates of mind uploading, such as Ray Kurzweil, Nick Bostrom, and Randal Koene, believe that it could allow humans to transcend the limitations of the human condition and potentially live longer. However, the feasibility of mind uploading relies on three core assumptions.
The first assumption is the development of technology that can facilitate mind uploading in the coming decades. While simulating the human brain is a monumental challenge due to its complexity, neuroscientists have made progress in mapping the brains of simpler organisms. Mapping a human brain may take time, but with advancements in efficiency, mind-uploading technology could be possible within the lifetimes of future generations.
The second assumption is that a simulated brain would give rise to a conscious mind. Many cognitive scientists believe that it is the complex neural structure of the brain that creates consciousness, rather than its biological matter. Simulating a brain on a computer would replicate its structure and potentially replicate consciousness.
The third assumption is that the person created through mind uploading is truly the same individual. Philosophically, there are different perspectives on personal identity. The biological camp believes that personal identity is tied to the continuity of the biological organism, while the mental camp argues that personal identity is based on shared mental experiences. The implications of these perspectives impact whether mind uploading would be a genuine continuation of one’s present mental life.
However, there is a caveat to consider. If the original biological form also survives the uploading process, it raises questions about whether the uploaded mind can truly be considered the same person. It is unlikely that one person can split into two separate individuals simultaneously. The intuitive perspective is that the biological form would continue as the real person, while the upload would be a mental copy.
Unfortunately, the artificial mind assumption and the survival assumption cannot be empirically tested without actually undergoing the process of mind uploading. Therefore, mind uploading will always involve a leap of faith. It may only be a viable option for individuals who are certain that their biological hardware will not last much longer.
